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CRIMINAL LAW—AN EMBEZZLEMENT INTERMEZZO: SCHEMING TO
SIDE-STEP TOUSSIE V. UNITED STATES’S CONTINUING OFFENSE TEST
ABSTRACT
Though federal statutes of limitations normally act as predictable
time bars on prosecution, if a crime is a continuing offense then the
statute will be tolled until the last act in furtherance of the crime is
complete. Recently, a split has emerged among the federal circuit
courts, and even within the Federal District Courts of Massachusetts, as
to whether the crime of embezzlement is a continuing offense when it is
performed as a passive scheme, such as via automated deposits into a
checking account.
The author argues that embezzlement, as codified in 18 U.S.C. §
641, should never be considered a continuing offense. The plain
language of the statute does not label embezzlement a continuing
offense. Furthermore, the Toussie v. United States decision, which
created the modern test for whether a crime is a continuing offense,
supports a narrow interpretation of the doctrine. The test for whether a
crime is a continuing offense turns on the nature of a crime, not the
manner in which it is committed in a specific case. Therefore,
embezzlement cannot become a continuing offense when the particular
mechanism used in the theft is automated. Rather, the continuing
offense exception should not apply to embezzlement because
embezzlement is closely related to larceny, an instantaneous offense. In
addition, a narrow application of the continuing offense doctrine
reduces the chance of unfair trials and limits the potential abuse of
prosecutorial discretion. Instead of expanding the continuing offense
doctrine, the judiciary should adhere to the legislature’s decision to
provide a five-year cutoff date for prosecutions of embezzlement.
INTRODUCTION
The intersection of embezzlement and the continuing offense
doctrine is best illustrated by a hypothetical. Let us assume that forty
years ago the fictitious Vincent Villain crafted an accounting glitch to
instantly embezzle ten thousand dollars from the federal government as
well as an additional four hundred dollars once every month. Four years
ago, Mr. Villain put a stop to his steady siphoning. This year, an audit
revealed Mr. Villain’s scheme and the federal government subsequently
249
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indicted him for embezzling a total of two hundred and two thousand
dollars, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.1
The statute of limitations period for embezzlement under 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 is five years.2 If Mr. Villain lived in Virginia, part of the Fourth
Circuit, where a passive scheme of embezzlement is considered a
continuing offense, he could be prosecuted for all of his previous
embezzlements, including the initial, forty-year-old theft of ten thousand
dollars.3 In contrast, if Mr. Villain lived in Connecticut, part of the
Second Circuit, he could only be prosecuted for the embezzlements
occurring within the past five years—a total of forty-eight hundred
dollars.4
Assuming Mr. Villain had no previous criminal convictions, his
maximum punishment in Connecticut would be six months in prison; in
Virginia, he could be jailed for two years and nine months for the same
actions.5 And if Mr. Villain had performed his dastardly deeds in
Massachusetts, the result would be entirely speculative due to discord on
this issue among the district courts of the First Circuit.6
This incongruity results from differing interpretations of Toussie v.
United States,7 which created the modern test for whether a crime is a
continuing offense.8 Though the statute of limitations normally begins
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006) (“Whoever embezzles . . . any record, voucher, money,
or thing of value of the United States . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years . . . .”).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person
shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is
found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been
committed.”).
3. See United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 567-68 (4th Cir. 2004).
4. See United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 690 (2d Cir. 1994).
5. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§2B1.1(b)(1)(A), (G) (2010); §5A.
The total theft for the past five years would have been $4,800, an offense level of 6; the total
theft of the past forty years would have been $202,000, an offense level of 18. §2B1.1. These
calculations assume that there are no other factors impacting the final offense level or
justifying a departure of any sort from the recommendations of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
6. Compare United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (D. Mass.
2010) (holding that a passive scheme of embezzlement is a continuing offense), with
Transcript of Record at 6-7, United States v. Colon, No. 08-10305-WGY, slip op. (D. Mass.
Apr. 13, 2010) (holding that embezzlement as defined in § 641 is not a continuing offense),
and United States v. Bundy, No. 08-196, 2009 WL 902064, at *9-10 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2009)
(stating that embezzlement under § 641 is “inherently not” a continuing offense), and United
States v. Young, 694 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D. Me. 2010) (adopting the reasoning of Bundy that
embezzlement is not a continuing offense).
7. 397 U.S. 112, 113-14 (1970), overruled by 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 on other grounds as
stated by, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 890 F.2d 1088, 1091-92 (10th Cir. 1989).
8. This Note addresses the criminal continuing offense doctrine. For an in-depth
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to run immediately after a crime is committed,9 a continuing offense
tolls the statute until the wrongdoer performs the last act in furtherance
of the crime.10 Since Toussie, courts have declared various crimes to be
continuing offenses.11 However, a split has emerged among circuit
courts12—and even among the district courts of the First Circuit13—as to
whether the crime of embezzlement is a continuing offense when
executed as a passive, automated scheme. This Note will argue that
embezzlement, as criminalized in 18 U.S.C. § 641, is never a continuing
offense. The judiciary should respect Congress’s decision to set a fiveyear statute of limitations by refusing to expand the narrow doctrine set
forth in Toussie.14
Part I of this Note will review the history of embezzlement and its
criminalization in 18 U.S.C. § 641 and will conclude with the history of
the continuing offense doctrine through the Toussie decision, in which
the Supreme Court defined the modern rule for discerning whether a
crime is a continuing offense (hereinafter referred to as the “Toussie
test”).15 Part II will examine the differing judicial decisions regarding
whether embezzlement is a continuing offense. It will review a Seventh
Circuit case holding that embezzlement is not a continuing offense and
two cases reaching the contrary conclusion. Part III of this Note will
discussion of its civil counterpart, the “continuing violation,” see generally Kyle Graham, The
Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 283 (2008).
9. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.
10. Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 641-42 (1954) [hereinafter Penetrable Barrier].
11. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980) (holding that the crime
of escape is a continuing offense); United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1418-19 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that failure to appear is a continuing offense); United States v. Banks, 708 F.
Supp. 2d 622, 625 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (holding that failure to disclose facts affecting a
defendant’s right to Social Security benefits is a continuing offense).
12. Compare United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 690 (2d Cir. 1994) (reasoning
that the defendant could not be punished for embezzlement that occurred before the five-year
statute of limitations), with United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 567-68 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a passive scheme of embezzlement is a continuing offense).
13. See supra note 6.
14. One scholar recently addressed the expansion of the continuing offense doctrine by
federal courts, asserting that the test for continuing offenses is based on the statutory
definition of the crime, not the active or passive nature of a defendant’s conduct. Jeffrey R.
Boles, Easing the Tension Between Statutes of Limitations and the Continuing Offense
Doctrine, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 219, 243-44 (2012). This Note will expand upon that
article’s analysis, providing additional reasons why the crime of embezzlement in particular is
not a continuing offense.
15. The two-pronged test states a crime is a continuing offense if “the explicit language
of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime
involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing
one.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (emphasis added).
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argue that the facts and language of the Toussie decision indicate the
continuing offense doctrine should be narrowly applied. This Note will
further argue that the common roots between embezzlement and larceny,
which is traditionally not considered a continuing offense,16 support the
conclusion that embezzlement, too, is not a continuing offense. Finally,
Part III will conclude with an evaluation of public policy benefits
provided by a narrow application of the continuing offense doctrine.
Indeed, expanding the doctrine prevents statutes of limitations from
providing a bright-line cutoff date for legal actions, which is a primary
reason for their existence.17
I.

THE HISTORY OF EMBEZZLEMENT UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 641
AND THE CONTINUING OFFENSE DOCTRINE

A. The History of Embezzlement and Its Criminalization by 18 U.S.C. §
641
Embezzlement in the American justice system finds its roots in
English common law larceny.18 In the federal courts, embezzlement is
“the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such
property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come.”19
If “the original taking of the property was lawful, or with the consent of
the owner,” the felonious conduct should be charged as embezzlement.20
However, if the owner gave no consent to the seizure of property, such
an action should be charged as larceny.21
16. United States v. Tackett, No. 11-15-ART, 2011 WL 4005347, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Sept.
8, 2011) (“Courts do not traditionally consider theft a continuing offense. A man who breaks
into a bank vault five times in a month has committed five separate offenses, not a single
continuing one.”).
17. See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 115, 116 (2008).
18. United States v. Young, 955 F.2d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing English case law).
In the eighteenth century, English courts held that only those who unlawfully wrenched
possession of money or goods from a victim might be charged with larceny. Id. Therefore, if
one were given legal possession of property and later sold it or used it in an unauthorized
manner, no crime had been committed. Id. The English parliament responded by enacting the
first embezzlement statute, outlawing the conversion of lawfully obtained money or goods.
Id.
19. Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268, 269 (1895).
20. Id. at 269-70.
21. Id.; see also United States v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1986). The
Stockton court explained that:
The crime of embezzlement builds on the concept of conversion, but adds two
further elements. First, the embezzled property must have been in the lawful
possession of the defendant at the time of its appropriation. . . . Second,
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Section 641 is one of many statutes criminalizing embezzlement.22
Its first two paragraphs punish two mutually exclusive crimes: stealing
government property and knowingly receiving previously-stolen
government property.23 For example, if Vincent Villain received money
from a falsified Social Security claim, he would be guilty of the first
crime: embezzlement.24 This crime has the following elements: “(1) a
specific intent to (2) make a ‘knowing’ conversion (3) of governmental
property.”25
However, if someone else had set up the false Social Security claim
and Vincent Villain accepted some of the resulting money, knowing its
illicit origin, then he would instead be guilty of the second crime, which
is mutually exclusive from the first: retaining embezzled government
property for one’s own use.26 There are three elements to this crime: (1)
retaining a “thing of value” stolen from the government in violation of
the first paragraph of § 641, (2) with the intent to convert it to one’s own
use, and (3) knowing said property was stolen.27 Both of these crimes
are subject to the default federal five-year statute of limitations.28
embezzlement requires knowledge that the appropriation is contrary to the wishes of
the owner of the property.
Id.
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006) (outlawing embezzlement where government
agents appropriate funds from local governments that have received federal funds); 18 U.S.C.
§ 664 (2006) (criminalizing embezzlement of “assets of any employee welfare benefit plan or
employee pension benefit plan”); Paul C. Jorgensen, Embezzlement, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
513, 513 n.5 (1987). 18 U.S.C. § 641 traces its roots as far back as 1875, though its most
recent revision took place when the federal criminal code was revised in 1948. Peter J.G.
Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts Under Federal Law, PEPP. L. REV. 59, 91
(1994).
23. The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006) states “[w]hoever embezzles, steals,
purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another . . . any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value of the United States . . .” shall be fined or imprisoned. The second
paragraph states “[w]hoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to
his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted” shall also
be punished by a fine and/or imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006). If the total value stolen
in a single case was less than one thousand dollars, the maximum imprisonment would be one
year. Id. Otherwise, the maximum imprisonment would be ten years. Id.
24. United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (citations
omitted).
25. Id. at 288. Some embezzlement statutes have added a fourth element of acquiring
the property through a trusting or fiduciary relationship. United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d
561, 564-65 (4th Cir. 2004).
26. Beard, 713 F. Supp at 289.
27. Id. at 287-88.
28. “Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted,
tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.”
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006); United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188 (D.
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B. A Brief History of the Statute of Limitations and the Continuing
Offense Doctrine
A statute of limitations is an attempt to balance the “relative
interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving
justice.”29 It encompasses congressional weighing of the retributive goal
to punish wrongdoers with more utilitarian concerns such as judicial
efficiency and repose.30 There has been a default criminal statute of
limitations for all federal crimes in the United States since its founding.31
However, over the past few decades, courts and legislatures have created
and expanded many means of tolling statutes of limitations, increasing
the temporal reach of prosecutors.32 The continuing offense doctrine is
one of these common law exceptions.33 Over the past twenty years, its
use by the courts has greatly increased.34 This expansion of the doctrine
coincides conspicuously with the recent rise of the retributive rationale
for criminal punishment.35
The phrase “continuing offense” is a legal term of art; its meaning
is inconsistent with its ordinary interpretation as a continuing course of
conduct.36 Traditionally, a statute of limitations begins to run from the
instant the offense is completed.37 However, a continuing offense, in the
legal sense, consists of an extended course of conduct where the crime is
not technically complete until the last related act is committed, though
Mass. 2010).
29. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).
30. J. Anthony Chavez, Statutes of Limitations and the Right to a Fair Trial: When Is a
Crime Complete?, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2, 3 (1995).
31. Id. The initial default statute of limitations was two years, but was expanded to
three years in 1876, then to its modern five-year form in 1954. Id.
32. See Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 645-51 (describing various statutory and
common law means to toll a statute of limitations, including waiver, fleeing the jurisdiction,
and wartime suspension); Powell, supra note 17, at 137 (“Since the early 1990s, Congress has
been creating exceptions to the general rule at an unprecedented pace.”).
33. Chavez, supra note 30, at 3; see generally Harvard Law Review Association,
Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1220-37 (1950)
(listing exceptions to criminal statutes of limitations).
34. Boles, supra note 14, at 236-37.
35. See Powell, supra note 17, at 136-37.
36. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Rivlin, No. 07-CR-524 (SHS), 2007 WL 4276712, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007) (“[T]here
can be a distinction between conduct that is deemed a ‘continuing offense’ under Toussie and
conduct that constitutes a continuing course of criminal activity, but which is not deemed
‘continuing’ for limitations purposes.”).
37. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); see also United States v. Irvine,
98 U.S. 450, 452 (1878) (“Whenever the act or series of acts necessary to constitute a [crime]
have transpired, the crime is complete, and from that day the Statute of Limitations begins to
run against the prosecution.”).
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all elements of the crime may have been met at an earlier point in time.38
This effectively tolls the statute of limitations for the entire course of
conduct until the most recent act is completed.39 Though conspiracy is
the classic example of a continuing offense,40 federal courts have held
that this doctrine applies to many other crimes such as escape,41
bigamy,42 and possession.43 One primary goal of the continuing offense
doctrine is to prevent the inherently arbitrary application of the statute of
limitations to unlawful courses of conduct that continue beyond the
fulfillment of each element of the offense.44
The Supreme Court in Toussie v. United States45 created the current
test to determine whether a crime is a continuing offense, though the
doctrine has been used as far back as 1879.46 In a 6-3 decision, the
Toussie Court held that failure to register for the draft is not a continuing
offense,47 despite the fact that many circuit courts had previously treated
it as such.48
Robert Toussie failed to register for the draft when he turned 18,49
as required by the Universal Military Training and Service Act.50 He
was indicted for this crime eight years later, despite a five-year statute of
limitations, under the theory that failure to register is a continuing
offense.51 In deciding the appeal, the majority opinion stated that
statutes of limitations should be “liberally interpreted in favor of repose”
and the continuing offense doctrine “should be applied in only limited
circumstances.”52 The Court held that a crime is a continuing offense
38. Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 641-42.
39. Id. at 642.
40. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 610 (1910).
41. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980).
42. Yashar, 166 F.3d at 877.
43. United States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding unlawful possession
of a firearm is a continuing offense).
44. United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 2009).
45. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
46. United States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450, 450 (1879) (holding that the crime of
withholding is not a continuing offense). Prior to Toussie, the vague definition of a
continuing offense was “a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.” United
States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (citations omitted).
47. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122-23.
48. Id. at 135 n.19 (White, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 113 (majority opinion).
50. Universal Military Training and Service Act, §§ 3, 12(a).
51. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 113-14; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).
52. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 518, 522
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only if (1) “the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute
compels such a conclusion, or . . . ” (2) “the nature of the crime involved
is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a
continuing one.”53
Although the government agency charged with enforcing the draft
registration statute officially interpreted the duty to register as being
continuous until one turns twenty-six,54 the Toussie majority held that
the duty only lasted for five days after turning eighteen.55 The Court
stated that congressional silence on the issue of whether failure to
register was a continuing offense was evidence that this narrow doctrine
should not be applied.56 Additionally, it contrasted failure to register
with the classic continuing offense of conspiracy, in which “each day’s
acts bring a renewed threat of the substantive evil Congress sought to
prevent.”57 The majority favored a strict reading of the ambiguous
registration statute because Congress must speak in clear and definite
language in order to authorize the punishment of conduct.58
The dissent recognized the presumption that an offense is not
continuous.59 However, it proposed that an offense should be deemed
continuing if “the unlawful course of conduct is ‘set on foot by a single
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,’ until the ultimate
illegal objective is finally attained.”60 The language of this rule focuses
on the intent and actions of the defendant, in contrast to the majority’s
test, which is based on the nature of the crime itself.61 Additionally, the
dissent criticized the majority’s narrow reading of the registration
statute, pointing to a hearing transcript where Congress indicated its
belief that the duty to register had been continuous.62 After the Court’s
decision in Toussie, Congress amended the draft registration statute to
expressly state that the crime of failing to register for the draft is
continuous in nature from the time an individual turns eighteen until he
(1932)).
53. Id.
54. The President had ordered persons to register for the draft “on the day they attain
the eighteenth anniversary of the day of their birth, or within five days thereafter.” Id. at 118.
55. Id. at 118-19.
56. Id. at 120.
57. Id. at 122.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 135 (White, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 136 (quoting United States v. Midstate Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)).
61. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (majority opinion) (holding that a crime is a continuing
offense if “the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have
intended that it be treated as a continuing one”) (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 129-30 (White, J., dissenting).
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turns twenty-six.63
In summary, the continuing offense doctrine is one of many
exceptions to criminal statutes of limitations. A crime qualifies as a
continuing offense if “the explicit language of the substantive criminal
statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is
such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a
continuing one.”64 However, when applying this test to a passive
scheme of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 641, courts have reached
opposing conclusions.
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUING OFFENSE DOCTRINE
TO EMBEZZLEMENT
This Part will review persuasive judicial authority on both sides of
the issue of whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 in the form of a
passive scheme of embezzlement is a continuing offense. Part II.A
examines a circuit court’s reasoning in holding that passive schemes of
embezzlement are not continuing offenses. Part II.B describes the
reasoning of a circuit court and a district court reaching the opposite
conclusion.
Since Toussie, courts have disagreed over whether a violation of the
first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 641 is a continuing offense.65 The
majority of courts considering this issue have agreed that conversion in
general is not a continuing offense.66 And most courts have concluded
that active embezzlement is not a continuing offense, even if done
repeatedly as part of a single scheme.67 But passive schemes of
63. Chavez, supra note 30, at 4.
64. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.
65. See United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (D. Mass.
2010).
66. See United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 690 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 75 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Pease, No. CR-07-757-PHXDGC, 2008 WL 808683, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008); United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp.
285, 290 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (“The court finds that there is nothing in the explicit language of the
first paragraph of section 641 that would compel the conclusion that Congress extended the
limitations period for the crime of conversion.”). But see United States v. Neusom, 159 Fed.
App’x. 796, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
1993)) (defining an offense to be an entire scheme as opposed to each individual time all
elements of a crime are met).
67. See United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 567-68 (4th Cir. 2004) (limiting its
holding that embezzlement is a continuing offense to only when the embezzlement is part of a
passive scheme); United States v. Tackett, No. 11-15-ART, 2011 WL 4005347, at *1, *6
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2011); United States v. Duhamel, 770 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416 (D. Me. 2011).
But see United States v. Thompkins, No. 1:08CR65, 2008 WL 3200629, at *2 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 5, 2008) (holding that recurring, active embezzlement, which is part of a single scheme,
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embezzlement are a different story. If a defendant puts a scheme in
motion resulting in the recurring and passive embezzlement of funds, a
significant number of courts would hold that such a scheme is a
continuing offense, tolling the statute of limitations until the time of the
most recent embezzlement.68 An example of a passive scheme is when
one embezzles monthly Social Security benefits from the Social Security
Administration by direct deposit to a bank account.69
The initial
culpable behavior enabling the monthly embezzlement had required
active conduct, but the embezzler thereafter performs no additional act
to further the wrongful transfer of funds. In 2004, a divided Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that such a passive scheme of
embezzlement is a continuing offense.70 Since then, district courts from
a variety of jurisdictions have followed its reasoning,71 while others have
criticized it.72
A. Courts Reasoning That a Passive Scheme of Embezzlement Is Not a
Continuing Offense
Of the courts holding that embezzlement is not a continuing
offense, even when done via a passive scheme, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Yashar provided particularly robust
reasoning for its conclusion.73 In 1997, the federal government

is a continuing offense).
68. See Smith, 373 F.3d at 568; Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 191; United
States v. Gibson, No. 08-03057-01-CR-S-DGK, 2008 WL 4838226, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 6,
2008); United States v. Street, No. 3:07CR181TSL-JCS, 2008 WL 4372737, at *4 (S.D. Miss.
Sept. 19, 2008); United States v. Miller, 200 F. Supp. 2d 616, 618 (S.D. W.Va. 2002); United
States v. Aubrey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
69. E.g., Smith, 373 F.3d at 567-68; Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 682.
70. Smith, 373 F.3d at 567-68.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Easley, No. 4:10CR00240-01-BRW, 2011 WL 2265116
(E.D. Ark. June 8, 2011); United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 190-91
(D. Mass. 2010); United States v. Gibson, No. 08-03057-01-CR-S-DGK, 2008 WL 4838226,
at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2008); United States v. Street, No. 3:07CR181TSL-JCS, 2008 WL
4372737, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2008); United States v. Thompkins, No. 1:08CR65, 2008
WL 3200629, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2008).
72. See United States v. Young, 694 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D. Me. 2010); United States v.
Bundy, No. 08-196-P-H, 2009 WL 902064, at *6-7 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2009); United States v.
Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2009); see also United States v. Colon, No. 08-cr10305-WGY, slip op. at *6-7 (D. Mass. Apr. 13, 2010). Notice the split among district courts
within the First Circuit as to whether to endorse or reject Smith. Though the Young and Bundy
courts initially rejected the Smith reasoning, the Trang Huydoan Phan court has endorsed it.
See Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 190-91.
73. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1999). The court in United States v.
Silkowski implied that embezzlement under § 641 is not a continuing offense, but did not
squarely address the issue. 32 F.3d 682, 687, 690 (2d Cir. 1994).
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effectively charged Michael Yashar for embezzlement of $9,223 from
the city of Chicago between June 1, 1989 and September 1, 1992.74 The
government indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 666,75 which proscribes a
government agent’s embezzlement of government funds, under certain
conditions.76 The statute is substantially similar to 18 U.S.C. § 641 since
both criminalize embezzlement,77 vary the level of punishment based on
the value of what was stolen,78 and have a five-year statute of limitations
under 18 U.S.C. § 3282.79
In evaluating the issue on appeal, the court applied the Toussie
80
test to Yashar’s indictment, focusing on whether “the nature of the
crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that
it be treated as a continuing one.”81 The court rejected the government’s
argument that the test for a continuing offense turns on whether the
conduct of the defendant, giving rise to a criminal indictment, was
ongoing.82 Instead, the court reasoned that such an interpretation would
greatly expand the continuing offense doctrine, which turns on the
“wording and intent”83 of Congress, not on the prosecutor’s description
of the charged conduct.84
74. Yashar, 166 F.3d at 875. Though Yashar was indicted in 1998, he had signed a
waiver on August 13, 1997 as part of a criminal investigation that tolled the statute of
limitations indefinitely on his crimes. Id. Therefore, in order for the government to charge
him for the alleged conduct committed before August 13, 1992, it needed to demonstrate that
some exception to the statute of limitations applied to Yashar’s crimes.
75. Id.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006).
77. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006) (“Whoever embezzles . . . [s]hall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both . . . .”), with 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)
(“Whoever . . . embezzles . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.”).
78. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006) (“but if the value of such [embezzled] property in
the aggregate . . . does not exceed the sum of $1,000, he shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.”), with 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006) (enabling punishment only for
embezzlement of property “valued at $5,000 or more”).
79. See Yashar, 166 F.3d at 875; United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d
186, 188 (D. Mass. 2010).
80. A crime is a continuing offense only if “the explicit language of the substantive
criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that
Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.” Toussie v.
United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).
81. Id.
82. Yashar, 166 F.3d at 877.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1991) (“As this
passage makes clear, the analysis turns on the nature of the substantive offense, not on the
specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue.”), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Scarano, 76 F.3d 1471, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The Yashar court further stated “the active or passive nature of a
defendant’s actions has never been the benchmark of a continuing
offense under Toussie.”85 It pointed out that conspiracy, an offense
where affirmative conduct is required, is considered a classic continuing
offense.86 However, certain offenses based on passive conduct, such as
escape and bigamy, are also classic continuing offenses.87 Therefore, the
court concluded that the active or passive nature of the actions giving
rise to an indictment cannot determine whether the crime itself is a
continuing offense.88
Additionally, the Yashar court reasoned that if the test for whether a
crime is a continuing offense were based on whether the actions
described in the indictment were continuous, then prosecutorial power
would be unduly expanded.89 The court declared “[t]his approach would
transform the limitations period from a check on governmental delay in
prosecution to a function of prosecutorial discretion.”90 Ultimately, the
Seventh Circuit held that embezzlement under § 666 is not a continuing
offense, and therefore the government was limited to charging Yashar
for the offenses committed after August 13, 1992.91 Following the
publication of the Yashar decision in 1999, some courts have expressly
endorsed its logic when determining whether a crime is a continuing
offense, including when holding that a passive scheme of embezzlement
is not a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 641.92
B. Courts Reasoning That a Passive Scheme of Embezzlement Is a
Continuing Offense
Five years after the Yashar decision, the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Smith93 held that passive embezzlement is a continuing
offense.94 On January 24, 2003, Alfred Smith was indicted for failure to
85. Yashar, 166 F.3d at 877.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Boles, supra note 14, at 243-46 (arguing the test for a continuing
offense is based on the statutory definition of a crime, not the conduct of a defendant).
89. Yashar, 166 F.3d at 878.
90. Id. at 879.
91. Id. at 880.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 2009); United
States v. Bundy, No. 08-196P-H, 2009 WL 902064, at *6-7 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2009).
93. United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 2004).
94. Other federal courts had also held that embezzlement was a continuous offense, but
none provided a detailed explanation of the conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Neusom,
159 Fed. App’x. 796, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding passive schemes of embezzlement to be
continuing offenses under plain error review, but providing no support for the decision save a
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report the death of his mother to the Social Security Administration.95
Instead of notifying the government of this information, he had
continued to electronically collect her benefits, totaling $26,336, in a
joint bank account from March 1994 through February 1998.96 The trial
court allowed the prosecutor to aggregate the forty-eight deposits
(including those beyond the five-year statute of limitations) into a single
charge.97 After his conviction, Mr. Smith appealed the lower court’s
decision and the circuit court, in a divided opinion, affirmed the trial
court, holding that embezzlement is a continuing offense.98
The Smith court reasoned “the nature of embezzlement is such that
Congress must have intended that, in some circumstances, it be treated
in § 641 as a continuing offense.”99 The court pointed out that
embezzlement often occurs repeatedly over a period of time in small,
secretive amounts in order to avoid detection.100 Therefore, it reasoned
that “in those cases where the defendant created a recurring, automatic
scheme of embezzlement under section 641 by conversion of funds
voluntarily placed in the defendant’s possession by the government, and
maintained that scheme without need for affirmative acts linked to any
particular receipt of funds,” Congress must assuredly have intended the
crime to be a continuing offense.101 The court concluded that this
satisfies the second prong of the Toussie test,102 enabling the tolling of
the statute of limitations until the final act of embezzlement was
committed as part of the scheme.103
In contrast with the Yashar court, the Smith court used a fact-based
analysis in reaching its decision, reasoning “the specific conduct at issue
cite to United States v. Morales). The Morales court did not address embezzlement, but
bribery, and also failed to apply the Toussie test. United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 918
(9th Cir. 1993).
95. Smith, 373 F.3d at 563.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 563, 568.
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id. at 567. Some state courts have also embraced the continuing nature of
embezzlement. See, e.g., MacEwen v. State, 71 A.2d 464, 468-69 (Md. 1950) (“[I]n many
cases [embezzlement] runs for a long period of time and consists of converting different sums
of money on many dates to the use of the thief.”); State v. Roussin, 189 S.W.2d 983, 985 (Mo.
1945) (“We understand our statutory embezzlement lends itself much more readily to an
offense of a continuing nature.”).
101. Smith, 373 F.3d at 567-68.
102. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (A crime is a continuing
offense if “the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have
intended that it be treated as a continuing one”).
103. Smith, 373 F.3d at 568.
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here is more properly characterized as a continuing offense rather than a
series of separate acts.”104 It concluded that, though the specific type of
embezzlement committed by Smith was a continuing offense, not all
embezzlement necessarily fits under this exception.105
The Smith dissent stated that the Toussie test is expressly narrow in
scope,106 and the crime of embezzlement under § 641 does not meet its
requirements.107 The dissent reasoned that the second prong of the
Toussie test turns on the nature of the crime, not the specific conduct of
the defendant, stating “whether an offense is continuing in nature does
not change depending on the manner in which the offense is
The dissenting opinion further pointed out that
committed.”108
embezzlement is not inherently a continuing offense because it can be
done as a single, instantaneous offense or over time as a scheme, as the
majority stated.109
Finally, the dissenting opinion endorsed the
reasoning of the Yashar110 court, as Yashar’s passive embezzlement was
similar in nature to that committed by Smith.111
Many lower courts have adopted the reasoning in Smith.112 For
example, the court in United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan created a
split within the district courts of the First Circuit when it held that
embezzlement under § 641 is a continuing offense when executed as a
passive scheme.113 In April 2010, Trang Huydoan Phan (Ms. Phan) was
indicted for embezzling Social Security funds between 1999 and
2006.114 While working as a case manager helping immigrants, Ms.
Phan assisted a certain Mr. Luong in his successful application for Social
104. Id. Compare the Yashar case, which focused on the inherent nature of the
statutory crime. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United
States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 2009) (“It is impossible to reconcile [Smith’s]
analysis with the actual language of Toussie.”).
105. United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 568 (4th Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 569 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“As the Supreme Court said in Toussie,
‘continuing offenses are not to be too readily found.’”) (quoting Toussie, 397 U.S. at 116).
107. Id. at 568.
108. Id. at 569; see also Yashar, 166 F.3d at 877; United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493,
1506 n.12 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1991),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Scarano, 76 F.3d 1471, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996).
109. Smith, 373 F.3d at 569 (Michael, J., dissenting).
110. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873.
111. Smith, 373 F.3d at 569-70 (Michael, J., dissenting).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (D.
Mass. 2010); United States v. Gibson, No. 08-03057-01-CR-S-DGK, 2008 WL 4838226, at
*3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2008); United States v. Thompkins, No. 1:08CR65, 2008 WL 3200629,
at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2008).
113. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
114. Id. at 187-88.
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Security disability benefits.115 However, Mr. Luong’s checks were
mailed to Ms. Phan’s office where she would cash them, giving Mr.
Luong only $300 of his monthly benefits and keeping the remainder for
herself.116 In 2003, Mr. Luong recovered from his disability, but instead
of notifying the Social Security Agency of this fact, Ms. Phan arranged
for direct deposit of Mr. Luong’s benefits into her own account every
month through December 2006.117 Ms. Phan filed a motion to dismiss
the charges for the conduct committed prior to April of 2005.118
However, the trial court held that the scheme of embezzlement that Ms.
Phan carried out was a continuing offense.119
Although the Trang Huydoan Phan court recognized that all
previous district courts within the First Circuit had held embezzlement
under § 641 was not a continuing offense, it ultimately disagreed with
those courts.120
The court reasoned that a passive scheme of
embezzlement is similar to the classic “continuing offenses of escape,
possession, and conspiracy.”121 These crimes continue until affirmative
action is taken to stop them, similar to “[w]rongfully continuing to
receive SSI benefits as a result of an initial misrepresentation.”122
Furthermore, the court reasoned that there is no need to worry about
enlarging prosecutorial power by declaring that embezzlement “is
[sometimes] a continuing offense because such prosecutorial discretion
exists in all cases charging continuing offenses.”123
In addition, the court reasoned that the “deleterious effect on
society of [Ms. Phan’s] initial misrepresentation continued at least until
the payments stopped.”124 Moreover, the court noted Ms. Phan’s alleged
115. Id. at 187.
116. Id. at 188.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 191.
120. Id. at 189-90.
121. Id. at 190.
122. Id. Additionally, the second paragraph of § 641 criminalizes concealment and
retention—two crimes that are commonly considered continuing offenses. See United States
v. Banks, 708 F. Supp. 2d 622, 625-26 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (discussing other courts that have held
concealment is a continuing offense); United States v. Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100, 103 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding retention is a continuing offense). Therefore, it is more likely that Congress
intended its criminalization of embezzlement in the first paragraph to also be a continuing
offense. See United States v. Gibson, No. 08-03057-01-CR-S-DGK, 2008 WL 4838226, at *3
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2008).
123. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
124. Id. See also United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1993)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (stating one feature of “continuing offenses is that the harm done
to society through their commission necessarily continues on for as long as the crime is
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conduct was strikingly similar to the conduct at issue in Smith, justifying
the adoption of that court’s holding that passive schemes of
embezzlement are continuing offenses under § 641.125
The Trang Huydoan Phan court also seemed to consider a duplicity
ruling on an indictment as relevant to the decision of whether a crime is
a continuing offense.126 An indictment for a crime is duplicitous if it
improperly joins multiple distinct crimes into a single count.127 The goal
of this doctrine is to ensure that a jury has found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant has committed every crime for which he or she
is punished.128 The Trang Huydoan Phan court seemed to find the
duplicity of the defendant’s indictment as relevant to whether
embezzlement was a continuing offense by citing United States v.
Billingslea129 and United States v. Daley130 as support for its view that
passive embezzlement is a continuing offense.131 Billingslea dealt
exclusively with the issue of whether separate offenses may be
aggregated into a single count for purposes of calculating the total
amount stolen.132 And Daley merely answered the question of whether a
scheme of embezzlement, charged as a single offense, is duplicitous.133
Neither addressed the doctrine of continuing offenses.
As seen above, there is sharp disagreement in the federal courts
over whether embezzlement under § 641 is a continuing offense.
Though the Smith decision has been persuasive for many district courts,
others have followed the logic of the Yashar court,134 applying the
Toussie test narrowly to identify continuing offenses.

ongoing”).
125. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 190-91.
126. Id. at 191.
127. Separate offenses must be charged as distinct counts in an indictment. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 8(a). If an indictment “sets forth separate and distinct crimes in one count,” then it is
duplicitous. United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 415 (6th Cir. 2002).
128. Davis, 306 F.3d at 415 (6th Cir. 2002).
129. United States v. Billingslea, 603 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1979).
130. United States v. Daley, 454 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1972).
131. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
132. Billingslea, 603 F.2d at 518.
133. Daley, 454 F.2d at 509. The doctrines of duplicity and continuing offense are
easily confused, especially since “the presence of a common scheme uniting discrete acts has
traditionally been found to be relevant in determining whether an indictment should be
dismissed for duplicity.” United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 2009).
However, these doctrines have distinct tests and goals. Id. at 70-71.
134. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1999).
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III. EMBEZZLEMENT UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 641 SHOULD NEVER BE
CONSIDERED A CONTINUING OFFENSE
This Part of the Note argues that the tenor of the Toussie135 opinion,
the nature of embezzlement as a crime, and the policy goals of a statute
of limitations each support a conclusion that embezzlement is not a
continuing offense. Smith and its progeny have improperly expanded
the continuing offense doctrine, defeating congressional intent to confine
embezzlement indictments under § 641 to within five years of the
commission of the crime.136
Part III.A argues that the language and facts of the Toussie decision
support a narrow interpretation of the continuing offense doctrine. Part
III.B examines the roots of embezzlement in larceny, which is not a
continuing offense, and asserts that the overlapping natures of the two
crimes justify treating embezzlement as an instantaneous offense.
Finally, Part III.C discusses various policy considerations advanced by a
narrow application of the continuing offense doctrine.137
Though the recent trend toward retributive justifications for
punishment encourages courts to vitiate criminal statutes of
limitations,138 the judiciary must not ignore precedent and legislation in
applying the continuing offense doctrine. If embezzlement is to become
a continuing offense, it is the responsibility of Congress, not the
judiciary, to make it so. Given the inherently arbitrary nature of statutes
of limitations, it is much more appropriate for the legislature to make a
careful inquiry into value judgments regarding criminal time bars.
A. The Language of the Toussie Decision Compels a Narrow
Application of the Continuing Offense Doctrine
The Toussie court expressly stated “that continuing offenses are not
to be too readily found.”139 Additionally, statutes of limitations should

135. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) (restricting the government from prosecuting crimes
to “within five years next after such offense shall have been committed”).
137. Jeffrey Boles, in Easing the Tension Between Statutes of Limitations and the
Continuing Offense Doctrine, clearly described a fourth reason that embezzlement is not a
continuing offense. Namely, the second prong of the Toussie test is based on the nature of the
crime at issue. It was improper for the Smith court and others following its example to instead
focus on the actual actions of the defendant in determining whether the crime was a
continuing offense. See Boles, supra note 14, at 238-46 (analyzing and critiquing the
“charged conduct” approach by courts expanding the Toussie test).
138. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 17, at 124.
139. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 116.
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“be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.”140 Furthermore, when
deciding between two interpretations of a criminal statute, the Toussie
majority stated that Congress must speak “in language that is clear and
definite” in order to apply the harsher interpretation.141 The above
language demonstrates that the Toussie test must be narrowly
construed.142 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stood as a
bulwark against expansion of various exceptions to statutes of
limitations by the lower courts.143
The Smith court seemed to reason that the continuing offense
doctrine could expand the five-year statute of limitations defined in 18
U.S.C. § 3282 since it fits under that statute’s allowance of exceptions
that are “expressly required by law.”144 However, the doctrine of
continuing offenses is not an express requirement because it should be
applied narrowly,145 and derives from common law rather than statute.146
There is no reference to continuing offenses in the plain language of §
641,147 just as there was none in the Universal Military Training and
Service Act upon the Toussie court’s evaluation.148
In addition, the Trang Huydoan Phan court erroneously relied on
140. Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)).
141. Id. at 122 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
221-22 (1952)). In addition, the rule of lenity should be applied, which states that unclear
statutory language should be construed in favor of the defendant. Boles, supra note 14, at
254.
142. See United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 291 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (construing the
continuing offense doctrine narrowly in regards to conversion under 18 U.S.C. § 641 in order
to be “consistent with the Toussie mandate that criminal statutes ‘be liberally construed in
favor of repose’”); Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 645 (the continuing offense doctrine
“should be applied only on a limited scale; by applying the doctrine loosely, courts have a
potentially powerful weapon for the avoidance of statutes of limitations”).
143. Chavez, supra note 30, at 3 (listing cases over the past century where the Supreme
Court has held the statute of limitations barred criminal prosecutions).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3282; United States v. Smith, 373 F.3d 561, 563 (4th Cir. 2004).
145. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (“[T]he doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied
in only limited circumstances . . . .”).
146. See United States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450, 451-52 (1879). In Irvine, the Supreme
Court fashioned the basic test for deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run against
the government. Chavez, supra note 30, at 4.
147. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006) (never using the phrase “continuing offense”),
with 18 U.S.C. § 3284 (2006) (“The concealment of assets of a debtor in a case under title 11
shall be deemed to be a continuing offense . . . .”), and 22 U.S.C. § 618(e) (2006) (“Failure to
file any such registration statement or supplements thereto as is required by either section
612(a) or section 612(b) of this title shall be considered a continuing offense.”). See also
Boles, supra note 14, at 232 (“Most federal criminal offense statutes, however, do not contain
explicit language addressing whether the offense is a continuing one.”).
148. Compare Universal Military Training and Service Act, §§ 3, 12(a) (never using the
phrase “continuing offense”), with the statutes cited supra, note 147.
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the fact that a passive scheme of embezzlement may be charged as a
single count, without being duplicitous, as support for its conclusion that
embezzlement is a continuing offense.149 In fact, the purposes of the
duplicity doctrine are distinct from those of the continuing offense
doctrine.150 The continuing offense doctrine attempts to prevent the
arbitrary application of the statute of limitations to the few crimes in
which the evil that Congress sought to prevent continues past the
commission of all the elements of the crime.151 In contrast, the duplicity
doctrine attempts to address concerns of double jeopardy, notice for the
defendant, and “the danger that a conviction was produced by a verdict
that may not have been unanimous as to any one of the crimes
charged.”152 These concerns do not overlap with the goals of the statute
of limitations153 or the continuing offense doctrine.154 The confusion of
the doctrines may partially be explained by the fact that whether conduct
is a scheme or not is one test for determining if a charge is duplicitous.155
Though “separate acts united by a common scheme or pattern may be
charged together without any concern of impermissible duplicity,”156 “a
continuing offense is not the same as a scheme or pattern of illegal
conduct.”157 Therefore, whether an indictment is duplicitous or not is
irrelevant to determining whether the Toussie test is met.158
Moreover, the facts of the Toussie decision demonstrate just how
narrowly the continuing offense doctrine must be applied. Before
149. United States v. Trang Huydoan Phan, 754 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (D. Mass. 2010);
see Smith, 373 F.3d at 568.
150. United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2009).
151. Id. at 70.
152. Id. at 71 (quoting United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
153. These goals include protecting defendants against the degradation of evidence and
promoting repose. See supra Part I.A. and infra Part III.C.
154. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
155. A crime may be charged in a single count if the defendant is alleged to have
concocted “a plan or scheme or [set] up a mechanism which, when put into operation, [would]
result in the taking or diversion of sums of money on a recurring basis.” United States v.
Billingslea, 603 F.2d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1979). This test expressly allows for passive
schemes. Id. However, the Toussie test is entirely distinct, and does not explicitly refer to
schemes or the active/passive nature of conduct. See Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
156. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
157. United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 241 (D. Mass. 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 658
F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that a “scheme” of concealment is not a continuing offense).
158. The converse is also true—the fact that embezzlement is not a continuing offense
does not support the argument that an indictment is duplicitous. See United States v. Gray,
CRIM. 11-13, 2012 WL 1554649, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2012) (sidestepping the issue of
whether embezzlement is a continuing offense, but still holding that the indictment for
embezzlement over a decade was not duplicitous).
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Toussie, many federal courts held that failure to register for the draft was
a continuing offense.159 Indeed, the state of being unregistered is
continuous in nature, similar to the state of being escaped from
incarceration. Additionally, the government agency in charge of
applying the Universal Military Training and Service Act had issued an
official interpretation, declaring failure to register for the draft to be a
continuing offense.160 There was even evidence that Congress desired
the duty to register to be continuous, enabling indictment from the time
one turns eighteen until thirteen years later.161 Congressional intent
seems especially likely given that after Toussie was decided, Congress
immediately revised the Act to expressly convert failure to register for
the draft into a continuing offense.162 However, the Toussie majority
found that these indicia did not provide enough evidence to satisfy the
second prong of the narrow test “that Congress must assuredly have
intended”163 failure to register to be a continuing offense.
Likewise, there is not enough evidence of congressional intent to
substantiate a finding that embezzlement fits under the narrow
continuing offense doctrine. Section 641 traces its origins to before the
first Supreme Court case considering the continuing offense doctrine and
there is no evidence Congress considered such a doctrine when enacting
the statute.164 Furthermore, when § 641 was last recodified in 1948, the
federal courts had applied the continuing offense doctrine for over
seventy years.165 Yet, Congress did not use the opportunity to include
any indications that it wished to apply the doctrine to embezzlement. As
the Toussie court reasoned, “congressional silence is stronger in favor of
not construing this Act as incorporating a continuing-offense theory.”166
Given this lack of legislative history suggesting a desire for
embezzlement to be a continuing offense, the argument that
embezzlement as criminalized in § 641 is a continuing offense is much
weaker than the same argument used in Toussie.
In addition, unlike other statutes criminalizing continuing offenses,

159. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 119 (1970).
160. Id. at 115-116.
161. Id. at 129 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that “every other guide to statutory
interpretation points to” failure to register being a continuing offense).
162. Chavez, supra note 30, at 4.
163. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.
164. Section 641 traces its roots to 1875, while the first United States Supreme Court
case addressing the continuing offense doctrine was in 1878. See United States v. Irvine, 98
U.S. 450, 450 (1879); supra Part I.B.
165. See supra Part I.B.
166. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 120 (1970).
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§ 641 does not “clearly contemplate[] a prolonged course of conduct.”167
The statute authorizes punishment for anyone who “embezzles, steals,
purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or
without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of” government property.168
The acts of stealing, purloining, converting, selling, conveying, and
disposing of property are all logically discrete—each occurs at an exact
point in time and ceases thereafter. Therefore, Congress likely
considered embezzlement to be similarly discontinuous in nature.
Though the second paragraph of the statute criminalizes the continuing
offenses of retention and concealment of stolen property,169 that
paragraph addresses a distinct crime from the first—the crime of
knowingly holding property that someone else converted from the
government.170 If the accused committed the initial theft, he or she
cannot be charged under that paragraph.171
This Note’s recommendation to narrowly apply the continuing
offense doctrine stems from the desire to defer to legislative intent.172
Congress has expressly proscribed punishment for embezzlement
committed more than five years prior to an indictment.173 If Congress
wished to expand this window, it could modify the current statute of
limitations or enact a new one, increasing the time limit specifically for
crimes of embezzlement, as it has done repeatedly for other crimes.174

167. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006).
169. Id. (“Whoever receives, conceals, or retains [stolen property] with intent to convert
it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted . . . .”).
170. United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 289 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
171. Id. The government could make an interesting argument to circumvent the statute
of limitations using the continuing offense doctrine if it indicted an embezzler of Social
Security funds under the crime of concealment instead of embezzlement. See United States v.
Banks, 708 F. Supp. 2d 622, 623-27 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (holding concealment of facts affecting
defendant’s right to social security benefits, as criminalized in 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(3)(A), is
a continuing offense). However, even if a court held the concealment was a continuing
offense, the embezzlement would still be a separate crime requiring a distinct continuing
offense evaluation.
172. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 121 (“[Q]uestions of limitations are fundamentally matters of
legislative [] decision.”).
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).
174. See Powell, supra note 17, app. at 154-55 (listing many crimes, including
espionage, terrorism, and sexual abuse of children, for which Congress has individually
expanded the statute of limitations beyond the five-year default).
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B. The Discrete and Discreet Natures of Embezzlement
The nature of embezzlement demonstrates that Congress could not
have “assuredly . . . intended”175 for it to be a continuing offense. Since
embezzlement finds its roots in larceny, it shares a common nature with
that crime.176 Federal courts have often used larceny as an example of
an instantaneous offense that does not satisfy the Toussie test.177 Thus,
embezzlement, too, should be classified in that manner.
The crime of larceny is completed “as soon as there has been an
actual taking of the property of another without consent, with the intent
permanently to deprive the owner of its use.”178 Therefore, the statute of
limitations for the crime begins running as soon as the taking is
completed, and does not toll for as long as the wrongdoer continues to
possess the stolen property.179 A time bar on the crime of embezzlement
should operate in exactly the same way as the larceny time bar because
all of the elements of embezzlement are also completed upon the initial
conversion of the funds.180
Notably, the crime of larceny contains one nuance implying that it
is not as instantaneous as it initially appears. Larceny is broken down
into two elements: (1) the unlawful taking of property from another and
(2) the intent to steal the property.181 The element of taking is itself

175. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115.
176. United States v. Young, 955 F.2d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 1992); supra Part I.B.
177. See United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 75 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v.
McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Doane v. Com., 237 Se.2d 797, 798
(1977) (finding larceny to be a continuing offense in the realm of venue, but refusing to
extend the theory to satisfy the elements of felony-murder); Johnson v. State, 314 P.2d 366,
371 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (holding that multiple larcenies as part of a single scheme must
be charged as separate offenses). But see United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d 1245, 1250 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (assuming in passing that larceny is a continuous offense); Gomez v. Herndon, SA
CV 08-0800 ODWFMO, 2009 WL 1481115, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (assuming
larceny to be a continuing offense until the asportation element is complete).
178. McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078. Some courts have sidestepped this issue by defining
the entire scheme to be an “offense.” See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 11 F.3d 915, 918
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Neusom, 159 Fed. App’x. 796, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2005).
However, as the Morales dissent argued, a scheme can only be a single continuing offense if
the Toussie test is met, therefore such an expansive definition of “offense” fails to evade the
application of the test. Morales, 11 F.3d at 919 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing the continuing offense
limitations decisions in Morales and comparing them with other jurisdictions).
179. McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078; State v. King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973) (stating that
larceny, which includes elements of conversion, “[is] complete [] upon the taking”).
180. See United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (finding
that conversion of government funds satisfies the § 641 embezzlement statute).
181. Gomez v. Herndon, SA CV 08-0800 ODW (FMO), 2009 WL 1481115, at *5
(C.D. Cal. May 26, 2009).
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broken down into two aspects: (1) the actual transfer of possession
(caption) and (2) the transportation of the property (asportation).182 An
act of larceny is not considered complete until the asportation aspect of
the taking concludes.183 Therefore, an act of larceny continues while a
thief is moving the recently-stolen property to a secure location. For
example, let us assume a crafty collection of conspirators arranges to
abscond with a substantial quantity of ice cream from a warehouse using
a refrigeration truck. The statute of limitations would not begin to run
for these potential defendants until the truck arrives at a safe house with
its illicit-yet-delicious cargo. In this way, larceny is not inherently
instantaneous in nature, as the actual theft could potentially take place
over a period of time.
Despite the fact that larceny is not always instantaneously
performed, courts have often referred to it as an example of a crime that
is decidedly not a continuing offense.184 Though an act of larceny may
occasionally be continuing in the manner of its performance, this does
not satisfy the narrow second prong of the Toussie test that Congress
must assuredly have intended for the crime to be a continuing offense.
Similarly, a single act of embezzlement might be continuing in
performance, but that cannot be enough to satisfy the rigid Toussie
standard.
Notably, the major difference between larceny and
embezzlement is that the latter requires the prosecution to prove an extra
element—that the stolen property was lawfully entrusted with the
defendant when he or she converted it.185 This element does not
contemplate any additional ongoing conduct strong enough to justify
treating the latter as a continuing offense.
Furthermore, a passive scheme of embezzlement is not sufficiently
continuous in nature to be a continuing offense. In the well-settled
continuing offense of possession,186 all elements of the crime are met
every nanosecond that the perpetrator has possession of the property; the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the defendant loses

182. Id.
183. Id.; see also United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d 1245, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The
crime of larceny obviously continues as long as the asportation continues and the original
asportation continues at least so long as the perpetrator of the crime indicates by his actions
that he is dissatisfied with the location of the stolen goods immediately after the crime and
with no more than a few minutes delay causes another to continue the asportation.”).
184. See, e.g., McGoff, 831 F.2d at 1078; United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 75
(D.D.C. 2009).
185. Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268, 269 (1895); supra Part I.B.
186. See United States v. Berndt, 530 F.3d 553, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing cases
holding that possession is a continuing offense).
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possession of the property.187 Therefore, it is impossible to split the
period in which a single act of possession occurs into separate crimes to
charge individually. And, as a result, it is logical that Congress did not
intend for the statute of limitations to begin to run until the accused loses
possession of the property. This reasoning works analogously for the
continuing offenses of bigamy, escape, concealment, and retention, since
they also cannot be separated into discrete events at which the crimes
were committed.188
Conversely, a passive scheme of embezzlement can be split into
discrete events—when separate acts of embezzlement occur. Every time
property is converted by the accused, even if the conversion was set up
long ago by an automated mechanism, the elements of embezzlement are
met.189 As in larceny, once the piece of property has been converted, the
elements of embezzlement are no longer being met by the accused and
the statute of limitations begins to run.190 Since an embezzlement
scheme can be split into discrete actions that could be charged
individually, the conduct is not so inseparable “that Congress must
assuredly have intended” it to be a continuing offense.191
187. See United States v. Krstic, 558 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009); See Berndt, 530
F.3d at 555 (“Everyday experience tells us that we possess things until we lose them, abandon
them or they are taken from us.”); United States v. Winnie, 97 F.3d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1996).
188. See United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing classic
continuing offenses).
189. See United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (S.D. Ind. 1989); see also
United States v. Mubayyid, 567 F. Supp. 2d 223, 242 (D. Mass. 2008) (rejecting the
government’s argument that concealment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) is a continuing
offense because “[e]ach new affirmative act of concealment is a new criminal act, triggering a
new limitations period. Mere continuation or acceptance of an illegally-obtained benefit . . . is
not enough to extend the accrual of the limitations period”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 658
F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2011).
190. United States v. Tackett, No. 11-15-ART, 2011 WL 4005347, at *4 (E.D. Ky.
Sept. 8, 2011) (“Courts do not traditionally consider theft a continuing offense. A man who
breaks into a bank vault five times in a month has committed five separate offenses, not a
single continuing one.”); see also United States v. Sydnor, 12 F. App’x 141, 143 (4th Cir.
2001) (holding that theft from two cubicles in a short period of time was correctly charged as
two separate crimes); United States v. Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067, 1072-73 (11th Cir. 1996)
(noting that each transfer of money as part of a money laundering scheme is a separate
offense); United States v. Johnson, 612 F.2d 843, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding multiple
conversions of gasoline from a pipeline terminal which occurred over a single night were
three separate crimes). “A criminal’s single intent to commit multiple acts, however, affords
no ground for disregarding congressional intent to make each distinct act a single unit of
prosecution.” Id. at 847.
191. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). It may be argued that passive
schemes of embezzlement are similar to the classic continuing offense of conspiracy as both
consist of discreet actions and passive conduct to further the crime. However, one element of
conspiracy is an ongoing agreement. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940).
The definition of embezzlement contains no element with such a continuous nature.
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Additionally, a passive scheme of embezzlement does not share the
trait of all continuing offenses that “each day’s acts bring a renewed
threat of the substantive evil Congress sought to prevent.”192 Just as in
larceny, when the elements of embezzlement are met, the crime is
complete.193 In criminalizing embezzlement, Congress sought to prevent
the evil of the conversion of the property.194 If a passive scheme of
embezzlement were a continuing offense then, even after meeting every
element of the crime, an immediate threat of that embezzlement would
have to remain. However, since that property cannot be embezzled from
that victim again, there is no more threat.195 Therefore, embezzlement
should not be considered a continuing offense.
C. Policy Considerations Supporting a Narrow Application of the
Continuing Offense Doctrine
Although a time bar “permit[s] a rogue to escape,”196 it also
advances a variety of salutary policy goals. The primary justification for
a statute of limitations is to ensure fairness for a defendant by decreasing
the likelihood of an unjust trial resulting from the degradation of
evidence.197 However, it provides a host of additional benefits by
creating repose for potential defendants,198 providing a bright temporal
Therefore, the similarity between conspiracy and passive embezzlement does not justify the
conclusion “that Congress must assuredly have intended” the conduct to be a continuing
offense, especially given the Toussie Court’s repeated admonitions to narrowly apply the test.
Id.
192. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122.
193. See Beard, 713 F. Supp. at 288-89.
194. Tackett, 2011 WL 4005347, at *4 (“The ‘evil’ may resume a few days later when
the thief steals again, but it is a new evil, separate from the first.”).
195. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122. In a passive scheme of monthly, automated
embezzlement of funds, one might argue that the threat of the next month’s embezzlement is
renewed each day, making such a scheme more like a continuing offense. However, the
future embezzlement threatened is a different crime from the embezzlements that have already
occurred. This stands in contrast to the crimes of conspiracy or possession, where the evil
threatened is the continuation of the same conspiracy or possession.
196. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943).
197. James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (2004); Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 33, at
1185. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003) (explaining that time bars partly
result from “concern that the passage of time has eroded memories or made witnesses or other
evidence unavailable”).
198. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1953) (There is a “longstanding congressional ‘policy of repose’ that is fundamental to our society and our criminal
law”). Repose has four functions: “(a) to allow peace of mind; (b) to avoid disrupting settled
expectations; (c) to reduce uncertainty about the future; and (d) to reduce the cost of measures
designed to guard against the risk of untimely claims.” Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich,
The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 460 (1997).
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line as to when a crime may be prosecuted,199 decreasing the costs of
prosecution,200 encouraging efficiency in criminal investigations,201 and
limiting the potential for abuse of government power.202
Time bars provide a fair trial to defendants by “protect[ing]
individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the
basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time . . . .”203
Evidence degrades over the years—memories erode, witnesses become
unavailable, and physical artifacts deteriorate.204 When a defendant is
indicted for an offense allegedly committed years ago, not only does he
lose access to exculpatory evidence, but prosecutors are also unable to
base their case on credible data.205
If the hypothetical Vincent Villain had lived in the Fourth Circuit,
then there would be serious concerns over the accuracy of the forty-yearold evidence required to prosecute the case. A trial based on such
atrophied evidence would have an increased risk of a false conviction.206
Therefore, the fundamental right to a fair trial supports a narrow
application of the continuing offense doctrine.207
Additionally, a narrow interpretation of the continuing offense
doctrine is congruent with the congressional policy of repose for
individuals and the nation—a policy “that is fundamental to our society
and our criminal law.”208 A statute of limitations is the primary
199. Powell, supra note 17, at 116.
200. Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale for the Existence of Statutes
of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 100-01 (2002).
201. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); Penetrable Barrier, supra
note 10, at 633.
202. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1999).
203. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114. See also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003)
(“[A] statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no
quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict.”).
204. Stogner, 539 U.S. at 615; see also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (“Statutes of limitation . . . are designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.”).
205. Powell, supra note 17, at 129.
206. Id.
207. See Id.; see also Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 642 (“[T]he effect of the
doctrine [of continuing offenses] may be a conflict with the purposes of the statute of
limitations since evidence of acts which would ordinarily be barred by the statute are
admissible to prove acts which are not so barred.”).
208. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1953) (quoting United States v.
Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)); Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970)
(criminal statutes of limitations are “to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose”). The fact
that a statute of limitations exists at all for criminal behavior evidences congressional concern
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constraint on the government’s ability to punish for aged culpable
conduct.209 In effect, when the statute has run, the criminal has been
forgiven for his past conduct.210 This is a generous act of mercy by the
government that provides many benefits to the individual and the
country. For example, it encourages societal healing by limiting
prosecutions for older crimes.211
Furthermore, refusing to apply the continuing offense doctrine to
embezzlement does not allow criminals to completely evade punishment
for their actions. Rather, the temporal reach of the government is merely
shortened. In the case of Vincent Villain, a holding that his passive
embezzlement had not been a continuing offense would not prevent the
government from charging him for his illicit conduct over the past five
years—allegations that could result in his incarceration.212
A narrow approach to the continuing offense doctrine creates a
brighter line between crimes that are continuing offenses and crimes that
are not. Since the Toussie test is not fact-based, but is instead based on
the language of the criminal statute,213 a narrow approach encourages
consistency among courts and prevents courts from having to decide
whether particular factual allegations are continuing offenses. Indeed, a
fact-based approach for whether conduct is a scheme or not defeats one
of the primary goals of statutes of limitations: to “limit[] the need for
case-by-case inquiry into the appropriateness of prosecution.”214
In addition, a strict construction of the Toussie test for continuing
offenses places an important check on prosecutorial power.215
Prosecutors currently enjoy a significant degree of discretion in the
criminal justice system.216 For example, prosecutors may decide which
crimes to include in an indictment or complaint.217 In exercising such
discretion, prosecutors subject defendants to their individual biases,
over repose. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006); see also Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-16.
209. See Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 630 (“A criminal statute of limitations . .
. is an act of grace . . . .”).
210. See id. at 630 (“Absent such a statute a criminal act may be the basis of a
prosecution at any time after its commission.”).
211. Powell, supra note 17, at 130.
212. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2B1.1 (2010); §5G1.1; §5
Sentencing Table.
213. See supra note 136.
214. Powell, supra note 17, at 116.
215. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1999).
216. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-5
(2011).
217. ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 5 (Oxford University Press 2007).
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potentially resulting in similarly situated individuals facing very
different criminal charges.218 Prosecutors also engage in the process of
overcharging defendants with crimes in order to gain an advantage in
plea-bargaining.219
These practices can lead to the haphazard
application of embezzlement law to alleged criminals.220 To prevent
such arbitrary application of criminal law, courts should limit
prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to write an indictment as a
continuing offense.
Moreover, as the Yashar court reasoned, an expansion of the
continuing offense doctrine would cause the running of the statute of
limitations to turn on the prosecutor’s charging decision.221 If a
prosecutor chose to word the indictment as a single crime, it would be a
continuing offense and the defendant could be punished for each act of
embezzling in the scheme. But, if a prosecutor wrote the indictment in
such a way that it listed the individual embezzlements as separate
counts, the embezzlements older than five years would be dismissed. As
the court noted, “[t]his approach would transform the limitations period
from a check on governmental delay in prosecution to a function of
prosecutorial discretion.”222 A crime should inherently be a continuing
offense—the distinction should not be based on whether a prosecutor
words the embezzlement as a single count of an ongoing scheme or
separates it into individual acts of embezzlement.
Also, “[a]rtful prosecutors rarely are barred by limitations, even
when the critical events occurred in the distant past.”223 Should courts
adopt a narrow application of the continuing offense doctrine, the
government would still retain significant abilities to evade a time bar
when charging for embezzlement. Instead of charging for the actual
embezzlement of the funds, the government could charge for retention or
possession of the stolen money, both of which are continuing
offenses.224 It could also charge for the concealment of any stolen
property.225 If the property was embezzled from the Social Security
218. Id. at 35.
219. Id. at 31.
220. Id. at 35.
221. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1999).
222. Id.
223. Chavez, supra note 30, at 2; see also DAVIS, supra note 217, at 15-17 (expressing
concerns over the wide discretion afforded to prosecutors).
224. However, the government would not be able to use the second paragraph of § 641
for this, since that paragraph only applies to a party who did not initially steal the government
property. See United States v. Beard, 713 F. Supp. 285, 289 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3284 (2006); United States v. Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100, 103 (4th Cir.
1994) (concealing and retaining stolen property is a continuing offense).

O'SHEA FINAL 51313.DOC

2013]

5/15/13 2:44 PM

AN EMBEZZLEMENT INTERMEZZO

277

Administration through not revealing information that would cause a
cessation of benefits, then the prosecutor could even charge for
concealment of information.226 Therefore, applying the Toussie test
narrowly would not allow a rogue to completely escape punishment.
Rather, it would merely prevent the State from using one of the many
criminal charges at its disposal for the theft, decreasing the potential
total punishment.
Additionally, Congress could choose to expand the statute of
limitations for embezzlement. Since embezzlement inherently involves
some measure of deception it would be sensible to give investigators
extra time to identify when the crime occurred. Congress could also
amend § 641 to specifically indicate that embezzlement is a continuing
offense.227 However, since embezzlement is significantly distinct in
nature from other continuing offenses,228 it would be more appropriate to
specifically expand the statute of limitations on embezzlement in
general.229
CONCLUSION
Embezzlement is never a continuing offense, even when executed
as a passive, automated scheme. The test for continuing offenses is
expressly narrow230 and should not be lightly expanded into new crimes,
as this would directly conflict with the congressional intent of a
predictable time bar.231 Furthermore, embezzlement by nature does not
share the same characteristics of classic continuing offenses, such as
bigamy. In addition, a narrow construction of the continuing offense
exception to criminal statutes of limitations accomplishes various
beneficial policy goals.
Though there is an understandable desire to ensure that deserving
criminals are punished, improperly expanding the continuing offense
doctrine beyond the clear instructions of the United States Supreme
226. 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(4) (2006). See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 43 F.R.D. 516,
519 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (defendant’s alleged failure to disclose death of her mother to the Social
Security Administration was the continuing offense of concealment).
227. If Congress took this action, it would make the crime a continuing offense under
the first prong of the Toussie test, since “the explicit language of the substantive criminal
statute [would] compel[] such a conclusion . . . .” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115
(1970).
228. See supra Part III.A-C.
229. Congress has taken this approach for many other crimes. For a comprehensive list
of specific crimes which have an expanded statute of limitations see Powell, supra note 17, at
154.
230. See supra Part III.A.
231. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).

O'SHEA FINAL 51313.DOC

278

5/15/13 2:44 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:249

Court and Congress is not an appropriate solution. The Toussie test
should not be expanded to accomplish retributive goals. Instead, courts
should defer to the legislature’s decision that the statute of limitations
for passive and active embezzlement, as criminalized in 18 U.S.C. § 641,
is five years.
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